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INTRODUCTION
Congress has created a sprawling statutory landscape of
antidiscrimination laws that prevent employers from considering
certain protected characteristics when deciding workplace matters.
Enacted in 1964, Title VII prohibits an employer from considering
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 1 Enacted in 1967, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits an employer
from considering age. 2 Finally, enacted in 1990, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from impermissibly
considering disability. 3 Though all three statutes feature unique
substantive provisions, originally they each shared identical causation
phrasing. 4 Specifically, these three civil rights statutes collectively
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., Dec. 2006, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a),
105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
2
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(2) (2006).
3
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a)(1), 122
Stat. 3553, 3557 (2008).
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1988) (forbidding an employer to act
adversely to an employee’s interests “because of such individual’s race, color,
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prohibited employers from discriminating against any employee
“because of” race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability. 5 Congress and the Court have spoken definitively to the
precise causation scheme of Title VII 6 and the ADEA 7 but remained
largely silent as to the ADA. Without clear instructions, courts
interpreting the ADA must look to relevant yet inconclusive guidance
from the Title VII and ADEA contexts and determine whether either
of these statutes’ divergent interpretations are applicable to the ADA.
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES: THE INTERPLAY OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, CIRCUIT CASE LAW, AND CONGRESSIONAL
REACTIONS
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Title VII’s Original Mixed-Motive
Causation Framework
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
held that a plaintiff could meet its burden in a Title VII employment
discrimination claim through a showing of mixed-motive causation.8
Amy Hopkins was a senior manager at the national accounting firm,
Price Waterhouse. 9 In 1982, a superior proposed her for partnership;
her candidacy was neither accepted nor denied, but rather accepted for
“reconsideration.” 10 Her evaluations hinged on her aggressive and
forthright nature, which led to both glowing praise and scathing
religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)
(forbidding an employer to act adversely to an employee’s interests “because of such
individual’s age) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (prohibiting
covered entities from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual”) (emphasis added).
5
Id.
6
§ 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (explicitly providing for mixed-motive causation).
7
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009) (5–4 decision)
(explicitly holding that the ADEA requires but-for causation).
8
490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
9
Id. at 231.
10
Id.
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criticism. 11 While her strong character had caused the firm to secure a
multi-million dollar contract with the state, it had also caused her coworkers and supervisors to describe her as macho, impatient, and
difficult to work with. 12
The Court noted that the plaintiff could meet her burden under
Title VII without showing that gender discrimination was the but-for
cause of the employer’s decision to delay her candidacy. 13 Most
simply put, the Court stated, “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as
colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation’ . . . is to misunderstand
them.” 14 Instead, Hopkins could meet her burden through a showing
of mixed-motive causation. 15 Thus, even if the defendant’s decision
relied on legitimate weaknesses in Hopkins’ credentials, Hopkins
could still prevail if she could show that the defendant also relied on
impermissible sexual stereotyping, a form of gender discrimination. 16
However, the Court also held that once a plaintiff met her burden
through a mixed-motive claim, the defendant had the opportunity to
completely escape liability through an affirmative defense. 17
Specifically, the employer will not be liable under Title VII if it shows
that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the
discriminatory consideration. 18
B. The 1991 Amendments: Congress’s Modification of Price
Waterhouse’s Title VII Causation Framework
Following the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Amendments), which, inter alia,
responded to the Price Waterhouse opinion. 19 Part of its response
11

Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 235.
13
Id. at 244.
14
Id. at 240.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 244, 251.
17
Id. at 246.
18
Id. at 244–45.
19
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
12
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codified the Court’s interpretation that “because of” supports a mixedmotive claim. 20 Congress explicitly provided for such causation by
exchanging the original Title VII causation language with:
Except as otherwise provided in this [title], an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice. 21
Notably, the 1991 Amendments did not alter the causation language in
the ADA or ADEA, which remained “because of.” 22
The 1991 Amendments also responded to the Price
Waterhouse decision by overriding its holding that an employer could
present an affirmative defense following a plaintiff’s showing of
mixed-motive causation. 23 Whereas the Court’s holding had relieved
an employer of all liability if it convinced the fact-finder that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of illegal motive, Congress
amended Title VII to authorize declaratory relief and attorney’s fees in
such a situation. 24 However, while ultimately liable, courts cannot
grant the employee “damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment” if the
defendant can show that legitimate considerations could independently
support the challenged action. 25

20

§ 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
Id. (emphasis added).
22
See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
23
§ 107 (b)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g))
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
25
§ 107 (b)(i)–(ii) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B)(i)–(ii)).
21
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C. Circuit Court Approaches to ADA Causation Following Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments
Following both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments,
nearly all of the federal circuit courts, including the Seventh Circuit, 26
applied mixed-motive causation to the ADA context. 27 In doing so,
they relied on both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments. 28
Price Waterhouse had found the phrase “because of” to include
mixed-motive claims, and the Amendments were construed to
demonstrate congressional agreement with such an interpretation. 29
With reinforcement from both the Court and Congress, federal circuit
courts comfortably authorized mixed-motive claims under the ADA. 30
The Sixth Circuit was the lone circuit to hold that in order for
plaintiffs to recover under the ADA, they would need to show that
their disability was the sole cause of the discrimination.31
D. Gross v. FBL Financial Services: ADEA’s But-For Causation
Framework
In 2009, the Court revisited the issue of causation under
employment discrimination statutes in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, which involved a claim brought under the ADEA. 32 Jack
26

Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999); see
Alek v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 54 F. App’x. 224, 225 (7th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).
27
Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Head v. Glacier
Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp.,
Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d
21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002); Baird ex. rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir.
1999); Owen v. Thermatool Corp., 155 F.3d 137, 139 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998); Doane v.
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 1997); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner
Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); see Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield
Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 2002).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 2004).
32
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009).
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Gross had worked as a claims administrator director for FBL Financial
Group since 1971. 33 In 2003, Gross’s employer reassigned the fiftyfour-year-old to a new position, filling his former duty with an
employee in her early forties whom Gross had previously
supervised. 34 While the employer argued that the reassignment had
been the product of a necessary corporate restructuring, Gross argued
that the reassignment violated the ADEA because it was really a
demotion based on his age. 35 Following a trial, the jury found that by
the preponderance of all of the evidence, age was a motivating factor
in the employer’s decision to reassign Gross because it had played a
part in the employer’s decision. 36 The employer appealed, arguing that
in order to sustain a finding of liability under mixed-motive causation,
Gross would need to provide direct evidence that it had considered age
in the reassignment. 37
The Supreme Court never reached the issue granted on
certiorari; instead, the Court held that regardless of the type of
evidence that ADEA plaintiffs produce, they cannot shift the burden to
the defendant upon a mixed-motive assertion. 38 As it did in Price
Waterhouse, the Court interpreted the phrase “because of.” 39 In direct
contrast to its precedent twenty years prior, in Gross, the Court found
the language to require a showing of “but-for” causation. 40 The Court
explicitly rejected Price Waterhouse as instructive authority because
of the 1991 Amendments. 41 It reasoned that where Congress amends
one piece of legislation, but remains silent regarding similar statutes, it
is presumed to have acted purposefully; thus, the Court found that
Congress had intended Title VII’s amended causation scheme to
operate differently from the ADEA’s untouched scheme. 42
33

Id. at 2346.
Id. at 2346–47.
35
Id. at 2347.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 2348.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2349.
42
Id.
34
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In a particularly sharp-tongued dissent, Justice Stevens, joined
by three other Justices, criticized the majority’s “crabbed
interpretation” 43 for blurring the lines of separation of powers and
“engag[ing] in unnecessary lawmaking.” 44 The dissent found the
majority’s holding to be a usurpation of congressional discretion in
order to effectuate a radical change in the policy of antidiscrimination
statutes. 45 Justice Stevens also criticized the majority for its poor legal
reasoning: “[u]nfortunately, the majority’s inattention to prudential
Court practices is matched by its utter disregard of our precedent and
Congress’ intent.” 46 The dissent argued that Price Waterhouse was
binding because it provided a relevant statutory analysis of the phrase
“because of.” 47 Additionally, the 1991 Amendments ratified this
interpretation, thus reflecting congressional intent that
antidiscrimination statutes should authorize mixed-motive claims. 48
Finally, though the 1991 Amendments did override Price
Waterhouse’s conclusion pertaining to the employer’s ultimate
liability, the dissent quite logically stated that Price Waterhouse’s
“affirmative defense did not alter the meaning of ‘because of.’” 49
E. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.: The Seventh Circuit’s
Extension of Gross to the ADA Context
In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., the Seventh Circuit,
in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Rovner, found that Kathleen
Serwatka could not recover under the ADA despite the trial court’s
conclusion that Rockwell had made an employment decision, at least
in part, based on its perception that Serwatka was disabled. 50 In
January 1988, Serwatka began working at Rockwell Automation, a
43

Id. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48
Id. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49
Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50
591 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2010).
44
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worldwide manufacturer of industrial automation components. 51
Around that time, she was diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear. 52 As a
result of this condition, Serwatka’s physician issued several work
restrictions, including that her employer limit her to sedentary work
and refrain from assigning her tasks that required her to lift more than
ten pounds. 53 Rockwell assigned her to the task of assembling drives,
a job which she could perform while sitting. 54 Over the years, these
drives became obsolete, and the need for Serwatka’s duty declined
accordingly. 55
There were notable factual disputes between Serwatka and
Rockwell. For example, while Serwatka asserted that her physician
lifted her work restrictions in 1999, Rockwell argued that it was
unaware of her revised restrictions until 2004. 56 Additionally, while
Serwatka asserted that she no longer needed to be limited to sedentary
tasks, Rockwell contended that it believed that her work restrictions
continued to limit her ability to perform any jobs involving standing or
walking. 57 On June 16, 2004, Rockwell Automation terminated
Serwatka’s employment. 58
Following a trial, the jury made two findings: (1) Rockwell
“terminate[d Serwatka] due to its perception that she was substantially
limited in her ability to walk or stand,” and (2) Rockwell would have
“discharged [Serwatka] if it did not believe she was substantially
limited in her ability to walk or stand, but everything else remained the
same.” 59 The Eastern District of Wisconsin, finding that the jury had
51

Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant, Rockwell
Automation, Inc. at 5, Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 08-4010 (7th Cir.
Feb. 10, 2009), 2009 WL 927655.
52
Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Serwatka v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 08-4010 (7th Cir. March 17, 2009), 2009 WL
927656.
53
Id.
54
Brief of Defendant, supra note 51, at 5.
55
Id.
56
Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 52, at 7.
57
Id.; Brief of Defendant, supra note 51, at 5.
58
Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 52, at 7.
59
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 2010).
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established a cognizable mixed-motive ADA claim, had granted
Serwatka declaratory relief and attorney’s fees. 60
The Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the ADA
does not recognize mixed-motive causation. 61 Judge Rovner noted that
in the absence of the recently-decided Gross decision, the Seventh
Circuit would have affirmed, continuing the circuit’s practice of
finding mixed-motive claims viable under the ADA. 62 In light of
Gross, however, the Seventh Circuit found that because the ADA does
not mimic Title VII’s “motivating factor” language, it, like the ADEA,
requires a plaintiff to show but-for causation. 63
Lastly, of significance, Judge Rovner revealed in a footnote
that Serwatka’s holding may not survive the effectiveness of the ADA
Amendments, which changed the “because of” language in the ADA
to “on the basis of.” 64 Judge Rovner stated, “[w]hether ‘on the basis
of’ means anything different from ‘because of,’ and whether this or
any other revision to the statute matters in terms of the viability of a
mixed-motive claim under the ADA, are not questions that we need to
consider in this appeal.” 65
F. The Seventh Circuit’s Broad Treatment of Gross Outside the
Antidiscrimination Context
The Seventh Circuit has understood Gross in extremely broad
terms. Not only has it held that Gross disallows any
66

60

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996 (E.D. Wis.

2008).
61

Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962.
Id. at 963 (“The district court certainly cannot be faulted for not anticipating
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross; our own prior decisions had held that mixedmotive claims were viable under the ADA . . . But in view of the Court’s intervening
decision in Gross, it is clear that [Serwatka’s award] cannot be sustained”).
63
Id. at 962.
64
Id. at 962 n.1.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 961 (construing Gross to mean that “when another anti-discrimination
statute lacks comparable language [to Title VII’s “motivating factor” phrase], a
mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute”).
62
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antidiscrimination statute to authorize mixed-motive causation absent
Title VII’s “motivating factor” language, but it has also held that
Gross disallows mixed-motive causation in statutory contexts entirely
outside the realm of antidiscrimination. 67 For example, in Serafinn v.
Local 722, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Seventh
Circuit mimicked Serwatka, holding that the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) did not allow for mixedmotive claims because its statutory language did not include the phrase
“motivating factor.” 68 Notably, the LMRDA, which does not deal with
discrimination, is hardly analogous to the ADEA. 69 Similarly, in
Fairley v. Andrews, the Seventh Circuit held that because 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not include language identical to Title VII, Gross
mandates plaintiffs to show but-for causation in asserting First
Amendment claims under this statutory provision. 70 Like the
LMRDA, § 1983 is not cleanly analogous to the ADEA. 71 The
combination of Serwatka, Serafinn, and Fairley indicates that the
Seventh Circuit has completely disregarded Gross’s own direction to
“be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a
67

Serafinn v. Local 722, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.
2010) (“Mixed-motive theories of liability are always improper in suits brought
under statutes without language comparable to the Civil Rights Act’s authorization
of claims that an improper consideration was a ‘motivating factor’ for the contested
action”); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 (7th Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Dec. 21, 2009) (No. 09-745) (holding that plaintiffs must show but-for
causation in First Amendment claims brought under § 1983 as a result of the Gross
decision).
68
Id.
69
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621 (stating that the purpose of the ADEA is to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace and to ensure that employers
assess older employees according only to their abilities) with 29 U.S.C. § 401
(stating that the main purpose of LMRDA is to ensure that employees are free from
corruption and unfairness resulting from employer and labor organization
misconduct).
70
578 F.3d at 525–26.
71
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621 (indicating that the purpose of the ADEA is to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace and to ensure that employers
assess older employees according only to their abilities) with 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(indicating that the main purpose of § 1983 is to provide a civil remedy for those
who are deprived of rights).
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different statute without careful and critical examination.” 72 Instead,
the Seventh Circuit has transformed Gross’s ADEA holding into a
blanket rule applying to all statutes, blindly prohibiting mixed-motive
causation to statutes lacking what can only be deemed as the “magic
words.”
G. Other Circuit Courts’ Reactions to Gross
Because of its recentness, Gross’s effect has not had time to
fully manifest in other courts. However, decisions from the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have already surfaced indicating that the
Seventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of Gross will likely be an
outlier. 73 The most noteworthy of these cases is Smith v. Xerox, Corp.,
where in direct contrast to Serwatka’s holding, the Fifth Circuit
expressly rejected the proposition that Gross requires but-for causation
in any statutory provision that lacks Title VII’s “motivating factor”
language. 74 Instead, Xerox held that Title VII’s retaliation provision
did accommodate mixed-motive claims. 75
Serwatka and Xerox explored facts that were notably similar:
the 1991 Amendments left both the ADA’s causation provision and
Title VII’s retaliation provision untouched, while explicitly providing
for mixed-motive causation in Title VII’s intentional discrimination
provision. 76 While Serwatka found this factual pattern to necessarily
fall under the command of Gross, 77 the Fifth Circuit held that such a

72

See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (quoting Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
73
See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2010); Brown v. J.
Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs.,
579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009); but see Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 626
(6th Cir. 2009) (applying the Gross rationale to ERCLA claims because the circuit
has held that ERCLA claims should be analyzed under the same standards as the
ADEA).
74
Xerox, 602 F.3d at 328.
75
Id.
76
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010);
Xerox, 602 F.3d at 328.
77
Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 961.
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simplified application of Gross was incorrect. 78 Xerox did not read
Gross as requiring any and all statutes to possess “motivating factor”
language in order to authorize mixed-motive causation. 79 Rather,
Xerox stated that “the Gross Court made clear that its focus was on
ADEA claims[,]” and to extend Gross to other statutory contexts
would be “contrary to [the Court’s] admonition against intermingling
interpretations of the two statutory schemes.” 80 Thus, Xerox held that
Title VII’s retaliation provision provides for mixed-motive causation,
even though its text does not include the phrase “motivating factor.” 81
Similarly, in Hunter v. Valley View Schools, the Sixth Circuit
declined to extend Gross outside of the ADEA context. 82 Prior to
Gross, the Sixth Circuit, guided by Title VII precedent, had
recognized mixed-motive causation under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). 83 Had the Sixth Circuit interpreted Gross as
Serwatka had, it would have held that the FMLA no longer recognized
mixed-motive causation because the FMLA lacks Title VII’s
“motivating factor” language. 84 Yet, the Sixth Circuit, like the Fifth
Circuit, did not interpret Gross so broadly. 85 Rather, it held that Gross
did not compel any result; it merely required the Court to “revisit the
propriety of applying Title VII precedent to the FMLA.” 86 Ultimately,
the Sixth Circuit held that Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive
framework was still applicable to FMLA retaliation claims. 87
Finally, in Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., the Third Circuit held that the
Price Waterhouse causation framework continued to apply to claims
78

Xerox, 602 F.3d at 328.
See id.
80
Id. at 329.
81
Id.
82
579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our reading of the FMLA
through the lens provided by Gross, we continue to find Price Waterhouse’s burdenshifting framework applicable to FMLA retaliation claims”).
83
Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir. 2008).
84
See also Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir.
2010).
85
Hunter, 579 F.3d at 691.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 692.
79
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brought under § 1981 following the Gross decision. 88 The court said
that Gross had no impact on its analysis because § 1981’s text is
different from that of the ADEA. 89 While § 1981 does not have the
“because of” language found in the ADEA, it also does not have the
phrase “motivating factor” found in Title VII. 90 Despite this, the court
held that § 1981 should be interpreted in step with Title VII because of
their similar statutory goals and contexts. 91 In addition to the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ narrower Gross readings, district court
decisions have deviated from the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
interpreting Gross. 92 Several district courts within the ambit of the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have continued to recognize mixed-motive
causation under the ADA following Gross. 93
II. CIRCUIT COURT STATUTORY ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING DIFFERENT STATUTES
A. Principles of Stare Decisis
Ultimately, whether the ADA allows plaintiffs to assert claims
through a showing of mixed-motive causation is a question of
statutory analysis. The first step in analyzing a statute is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning;
if so, the court is bound by such language. 94 The plainness or
ambiguity of the language is determined by reference to the text itself,
the specific context in which the text is used, and the broader context
88

581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id.
90
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence . . .”).
91
Brown, 581 F.3d at 182 n.5.
92
E.g., Williamson v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. H-07-3776, 2010 WL 774140, at
*12 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2010); Manickavasagar v. Va. Univ. Sch. of Med., 667 F.
Supp. 2d 635, 644 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2009); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm’n. v. SFAILA, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (E.D. La. 2009).
93
Id.
94
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1996).
89
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of the statute as a whole. 95 However, in Serwatka, Judge Rovner
bypassed the first fundamental step of statutory analysis, beginning the
opinion not with an independent and isolated examination of the ADA
phrase “because of,” but instead with an examination of the Supreme
Court’s prior interpretation of this phrase in different
antidiscrimination statutes. 96 Judge Rovner’s re-routing of traditional
statutory analysis was not in error, as the Supreme Court has held that
decided issues of statutory analysis are afforded a super presumption
of stare decisis. 97 This presumption forces into the Serwatka
discussion three different decisions, all of which have previously
analyzed the phrase “because of” in an antidiscrimination statute. 98
The first case to be considered is Foster v. Arthur Andersen,
LLP, a 1999 Seventh Circuit decision, holding that the ADA
recognizes mixed-motive causation. 99 Horizontal stare decisis, or the
concept that a panel’s decision binds all subsequent panels within that
circuit, is as strong as the super presumption of stare decisis towards
Supreme Court statutory interpretations. 100 Joining a majority of the
other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly adopted this super
presumption of horizontal stare decisis within the realm of statutory
construction. 101 Given this, Serwatka was obliged to follow Foster
unless the Supreme Court had created controlling precedent on the
issue. 102
95

Id.
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Our analysis of this issue begins with Price Waterhouse”).
97
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (stating that considerations of
stare decisis have special effect when a previous court has interpreted statutory
language).
98
See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029
(7th Cir. 1999).
99
168 F.3d at 1033.
100
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (2005).
101
See id.; Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994).
102
See Steinberg, 32 F.3d at 272.
96
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Of course, the Supreme Court has twice interpreted the phrase
“because of” in antidiscrimination statutes; thus, two more cases
necessarily enter the Serwatka analysis. First, the Court interpreted
“because of” in Price Waterhouse, finding that the phrase in Title VII
supported mixed-motive causation. 103 Second, twenty years later, the
Court analyzed “because of” in Gross, finding the same phrase in the
ADEA to equate to but-for causation. 104 Though both of these
decisions are largely relevant to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in
Serwatka, they do not warrant a strict, blind application. 105 Per the
Gross Court’s instruction, “[w]hen conducting statutory interpretation,
the Court ‘must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’
” 106 This instruction indicates that though these two cases and their
interpretation of “because of” are relevant to the Serwatka ADA issue,
they are not conclusive because neither speak directly to the ADA. 107
However, while the ultimate holding of the Court’s Title VII and
ADEA cases are not binding, their rationale may be, if it comfortably
extends to the ADA context.
B. Varying Circuit Court Approaches in Relying on Analogous
Supreme Court Precedent
Federal appeals courts disagree on how to approach statutory
interpretation where circuit precedent is directly on point and pertains
to the statute in question, and instructive Supreme Court precedent
also exists, but relates to a different statute. The Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have undergone fairly flexible analyses in deciding
whether Supreme Court precedent binds their decisions. The Second
Circuit, for example, does not consider Supreme Court precedent
103

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241–242.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009).
105
See id. at 2349 (stating that it is inappropriate to apply the Court’s
interpretation of one statute to a different statute without engaging in independent
analysis).
106
Id. (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
107
Id. (ADEA); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (Title VII).
104
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binding unless the Court’s reasoning applies to the different statutory
context “with equal force.” 108 Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have not explicitly stated a standard, but have simply
reconsidered their precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court
precedent, following the intervening decision only if they find the
related statutes to be completely analogous. 109 Slightly less deferential
to the Supreme Court interpretation, the Fifth Circuit will not
“overrule the decision of a prior [circuit] panel unless such overruling
is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.” 110
Finally, employing a greater level of adherence to the Supreme Court
interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit will overturn prior circuit
precedent if the intervening Supreme Court decision simply causes
tension with or undermines it. 111
Despite the slight differences in the level of deference that
appeals courts afford to such Supreme Court precedent, one general
rule stems: no circuit court finds that Supreme Court precedent
interpreting one statute is automatically binding to different statutes
merely because both laws share common language. Rather, all circuit
courts consider the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court decision
and determine whether such reasoning is relevant to the context of the
statute in question.

108

Castellano v. N.Y.C., 142 F.3d 58, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1998).
See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding that Robinson’s interpretation of Title VII’s ambiguous language
did not affect prior circuit interpretation of the ADA, which was unambiguous); see
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
Robinson rationale is inapplicable to the ADA because while recognizning former
employees under Title VII would increase the statute’s effectiveness, doing so under
the ADA would create a perverse incentive for the employer not to offer disability
benefits at all).
110
Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in
original).
111
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1045 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated
pending a reh’g en banc.
109
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C. A Helpful Example: Interpreting “Employee” under the ADA in
Light of the Court’s Analogous Title VII Decision, Robinson v. Shell
Oil, Inc.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ evolving interpretation of
the ADA’s use of the word “employees” serves as a helpful example
in showing how circuit courts approach statutory analysis of one
statute when the Supreme Court has interpreted identical wording in a
different statute. Prior to 1997, the Supreme Court had been silent as
to whether the word “employee” in any of the antidiscrimination
statutes included former employees. Under independent circuit
analyses, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held that the ADA’s
“employee” language only referred to current employees. 112 Following
these cases, the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil, Inc. held that
Title VII’s use of the same word also encompassed former
employees. 113 After Robinson, new ADA cases presented the circuits
with the tasks of re-examining whether the ADA includes former
employees and detangling two different, seemingly controlling
precedents. 114 On the one hand, the previous circuit cases, EEOC v.
CNA Insurance Companies and Gonzales v. Garner Food Services,
Inc., were directly on point because their analyses specifically
concerned the ADA’s language. 115 However, Robinson also demanded
attention because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of an identical
word, albeit in the context of a different statute, could mandate the
circuit courts to overrule their prior decisions. 116

112

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039,
1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523,
1528 (11th Cir. 1996).
113
519 U.S. 337, 346 (1996).
114
See Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1036; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 457.
115
CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1041, 1045; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528.
116
519 U.S. at 346.
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1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach in Johnson v. K- Mart Corp.
In examining the ADA’s meaning of “employee,” the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson v. K Mart Corp. held that its prior precedent could
not withstand Robinson. 117 Robinson had reasoned that the term
“employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision was ambiguous
because there was no temporal qualifier preceding it; thus, the Court
construed the word in accordance with the broader statutory purpose
of Title VII. 118 Noting that some ADA recitations of “employee” were
similarly ambiguous, the Eleventh Circuit overruled Gonzales because
it found tension between its prior holdings and the Court’s
interpretation. 119 The concurring judge agreed while clarifying the
proper approach in assessing whether Gonzales withstood
Robinson. 120 “[Federal circuit courts] are … compelled to overrule
[their] precedent when the rationale the Supreme Court uses in a [sic]
intervening case directly contradicts the analysis that [the circuit] has
used in a related area, and establishes that [the circuit’s] current rule is
wrong.” 121 Both the majority and concurrence found that the rationale
behind Robinson’s statutory analysis of Title VII’s retaliation
provision extended to the ADA’s intentional discrimination
provision. 122
However, the dissent strongly argued that Gonzales should
remain good law because Robinson did not address any ADA issues
and did not purport to overrule Gonzales. 123 Therefore, because
Robinson, a Title VII case, was not “squarely on point” with the ADA
issue, the Eleventh Circuit should have adhered to its existing
precedent in Gonzales. 124 Conceding that Robinson may have
overlapped with and weakened some of the reasoning in Gonzales,
117

Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1047.
Id. at 1043 (summarizing the Robinson decision).
119
Id. at 1045.
120
Id. at 1063 (Barkett, J., concurring).
121
Id. (emphasis in original).
122
Id. at 1047, 1063.
123
Id. at 1065 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
124
Id. at 1067.
118
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Judge Carnes insisted that a mere undermining of circuit precedent did
not warrant an overruling of it:
It is critical that when sitting as panel judges we be diligent in
policing the line between prior precedent that has been
contradicted and thereby overruled by intervening Supreme
Court precedent, and that which has been only weakened by it.
The strength and integrity of our prior precedent rule, upon
which so much rests, is dependent upon that distinction. 125
Though in disagreement about the extent to which an intervening
Supreme Court case need conflict with circuit case law in order to
overrule it, all three Eleventh Circuit judges agreed that the point of
comparison is the rationale behind the relevant cases. 126 Within the
debate, no judge contended that mere comparison of statutory text was
sufficient. 127 Despite this shared approach, the dissent came to a
different ultimate conclusion. 128 Judge Carnes reasoned that the
rationale of Robinson could not extend to the ADA context because
Title VII’s retaliation provisions and the ADA’s intentional
discrimination provisions are largely divergent in purpose and
legislative history. 129 Without a similar background or context,
rationale used to interpret Title VII retaliation claims could not apply
to the ADA. 130
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach in Morgan v. Joint Administration
Board
In contrast to Johnson, the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Joint
Administration Board held that its prior precedent did withstand
Robinson and that ADA’s “employee” language continued to exclude
125

Id.
Id. at 1047, 1063, 1065.
127
See id.
128
Id. at 1065 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
129
Id.
130
See id.
126
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former employees. 131 Even though Robinson had interpreted identical
language in an analogous statute, the Seventh Circuit, focusing on the
specific policy consequences of including retired employees under the
ADA, found the difference between Title VII’s “employees” in
retaliation claims and the ADA’s “employees” in intentional
discrimination claims to be “stark.” 132 Allowing retired employees
with disabilities to challenge disparate benefits under the ADA would
create a perverse incentive for employers not to provide any disability
coverage as part of their fringe benefits. 133 Title VII does not harbor
the same risk of perverse incentive because, unlike disability, 134 a
benefits plan cannot constitutionally differentiate treatment according
to race, color, sex, or national origin.135 Thus, the employer does not
risk Title VII challenges to its benefits plan from former employees.
The overall purpose of both Title VII and the ADA is to draw
protected classes of people into the workforce. 136 Interpreting Title
VII employees to encompass former employees may further such a
goal; however, doing the same with respect to the ADA would impede
it. 137 Because this argument is unique to the ADA and does not stretch
to Title VII, the court found that Robinson was not applicable to the
ADA. 138

131

268 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id.
133
Id.
134
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039,
1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a benefit plan that provided disparate coverage
depending on whether disabilities were mental or physical “may or may not be an
enlightened way to do things, but it was not discriminatory in the usual sense of the
term”).
135
E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (finding an equal
protection violation in a benefits plan that provided more favorable treatment to the
spouses of male employees than to the spouses of female employees).
136
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7) (“the Nation’s proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals”).
137
See id.
138
Morgan, 268 F.3d at 458.
132
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Reaching a sounder outcome, the Seventh Circuit’s approach
to the Robinson inquiry illustrates an important point. The Supreme
Court only considers an interpretation’s relation to the particular
context, policy, and history of the statute at issue. While often
Congress uses identical words to serve identical purposes, each piece
of legislation is ultimately unique. Thus, while analogous decisions
serve as guidance, each statute’s interpretation must also be unique.
Likely a result of the three Johnson judges’ debate on this issue, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated its opinion and will rehear the case en
banc. 139
D. The Serwatka Inquiry: Necessary Considerations in Determining if
the ADA Recognizes Mixed-Motive Causation
The Serwatka case involves additional folds to the Title
VII/ADA employee analysis. Akin to Gonzales and CNA Insurance,
Foster serves as existing case law directing Serwatka to recognize
mixed-motive causation in the ADA. 140 Akin to Robinson, Gross
serves as intervening Supreme Court precedent directing Serwatka to
authorize only but-for causation if its rationale logically extends into
the ADA context. 141 Price Waterhouse creates the additional fold,
serving as a Supreme Court case on which Foster relies and with
which Gross clashes. 142 Given this, Serwatka does not simply require
a single assessment of existing circuit precedent in light of one
analogous Supreme Court decision. Rather, the Serwatka analysis

139

Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). As a result
of the defendant filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, the Johnson case has not yet been
decided by an en banc panel. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d 1368, 1368 (11th
Cir. Feb. 14, 2002) (stating that no decision will be rendered until the bankruptcy
court grants relief from the automatic stay or the stay lapses).
140
Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 1999).
141
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
142
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245 (1989).
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mandates an inquiry into the Court’s two separate and entirely
conflicting interpretations of the phrase “because of.” 143
At first glance, Serwatka would only need to consider Gross’s
applicability because it is the Court’s most recent interpretation of
“because of.” 144 Where a court first interprets a given statute in one
way but later adopts a different interpretation, the latter interpretation
controls. 145 The Court decided Gross over twenty years after Price
Waterhouse; however, if it does not control the Serwatka decision,
Price Waterhouse could extend to Serwatka in two ways. First, the
general rule that only the most recent statutory interpretation is
controlling is not implicated when the former interpretation stems
from a separate statute. 146 Gross did not overrule or replace Price
Waterhouse outside of the ADEA context. 147 If the Seventh Circuit
determined that Gross did not to apply to the ADA context, Price
Waterhouse remains as a separate source of guiding interpretation.
Second, on a more practical level, if Gross does not control Serwatka,
the Seventh Circuit would be bound to follow existing circuit
precedent developed in the interim between Price Waterhouse and
Gross because of the principles of horizontal stare decisis.148 Foster,
the existing Seventh Circuit precedent, adopted the Price Waterhouse
analysis in finding that the ADA does recognize mixed-motive
causation. 149 Thus, in deciding whether Gross applies, the Seventh
143

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010)
(looking to both Price Waterhouse and Gross for guidance in determining whether
the ADA authorizes mixed-motive claims).
144
Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2350 (decided June 18, 2009).
145
Carlos E. González, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing
Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal
Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447, 504 (2001); see, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514
U.S. 695, 704 (1995) (trumping a prior interpretation of a statute).
146
See also Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 704 (offering new interpretation of unamended statute, where the Court had previously interpreted the same statute with a
contrary result).
147
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 (simply noting that the Court’s ADEA
interpretation is not controlled by Price Waterhouse).
148
Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (emphasizing principles
of horizontal stare decisis).
149
Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999).
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Circuit found itself in Serwatka as the referee between the two
Supreme Court interpretations of “because of.” First, the Serwatka
inquiry must determine if Gross’s rationale extends to the ADA
context. Second, if Gross is inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit needs to
revisit the propriety of applying the Price Waterhouse framework to
the ADA.
This Note examines which of the two Supreme Court
precedents is most applicable to the ADA. Ultimately, it concludes
that Serwatka was incorrectly decided and that the ADA does indeed
allow recovery under mixed-motive causation. First, this Note argues
that Gross’s ADEA rationale does not extend to the ADA context;
thus, Serwatka incorrectly relied on Gross. Second, this Note argues
that Price Waterhouse’s rationale in analyzing Title VII logically
extends to the ADA context. Moreover, the 1991 Amendments did not
undermine the continued viability of Price Waterhouse’s application
to the ADA; thus, the Seventh Circuit should have continued to adhere
to the Price Waterhouse analysis for ADA claims. Third, this Note
examines the effect of the 2008 ADA Amendments, which exchanged
the causation phrase “because of” with “on the basis of,” and
concludes that this modification did not mark Congress’ intent to
change causation under the ADA. Thus, the ADA should continue to
recognize mixed-motive causation.
III. IS GROSS APPLICABLE IN THE ADA CONTEXT? AN EXAMINATION OF
GROSS’S RATIONALE.
Serwatka erred when it concluded that Gross mandated an
overruling of Foster. Per Gross’s own instructions, one statute’s
analysis should not leak to another without careful and critical
examination. 150 As circuit precedent indicates, this examination must
be of the Supreme Court’s rationale in interpreting the statute as it
did. 151 First, Gross’s rationale in rejecting Price Waterhouse’s
application to the ADEA does not extend to the ADA. For purposes of
150

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1111
(9th Cir. 2000).
151
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this Note, this rationale will be referred to as the “Legislative Intent
Rationale.” Second, Gross’s vague rationale, used in its independent
statutory analysis of the ADEA’s “because of” language, does not
apply to the ADA. For purposes of this Note, this rationale will be
referred to as the “Statutory Interpretation Rationale.”
A. Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale is Inapplicable to the ADA.
The Gross opinion begins with a discussion concerning Price
Waterhouse’s applicability. 152 The Court found that the 1991
Amendments indicated that Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive
interpretation could not apply to the ADEA. 153 Because Congress
considered both the ADEA and Title VII simultaneously but only
explicitly provided for mixed-motive causation in Title VII, Congress
meant for the ADEA to have a causation scheme different from that of
Title VII. 154 Gross decided it “must give effect to Congress’
choice.” 155
Serwatka oversimplified this rationale, stating that Gross held
“that because the [ADEA] lacks the language found in Title VII
expressly recognizing mixed-motive claims, such claims are not
authorized by the ADEA.” 156 In so doing, it diluted Gross’s
examination of legislative history into a shallow test that simply looks
to the absence or presence of specific language within each statute.
While it is true that Gross ultimately held that Price Waterhouse could
not extend to the ADEA because it lacked Title VII’s amended
language, that holding was the product of a more developed
analysis. 157 The Court’s reasoning did not hinge on the mere inclusion
or exclusion of certain statutory words; rather, Gross’s rationale
hinged on congressional actions and considerations that preceded and
152

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 2350 n.3.
156
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010).
157
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (discussing the legislative history behind the
exclusion of “motivating factor” in the ADEA).
153
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caused the selection of statutory text. 158 Quite simply, Gross’s
rationale relied on the ADEA’s legislative intent. 159
This is the nub of the Seventh Circuit’s error in Serwatka. By
failing to realize the importance that congressional intent played in the
Gross analysis, it failed to compare the congressional intent of the
ADA to the ADEA in order to determine if the Gross rationale should
apply in Serwatka. Because congressional intent pertaining to the
ADA’s causation scheme is notably similar to Title VII and notably
dissimilar to the ADEA, Serwatka erred in concluding that Gross
prohibited the Price Waterhouse framework to apply to the ADA.
Gross’s reason for not extending Price Waterhouse’s mixedmotive causation framework to the ADEA was premised on the
Court’s negative inference that Congress intended for the ADEA to
feature a causation scheme different from that of Title VII. 160
Conversely, there is legislative history both within the 1991
Amendments and outside of the Amendments that clearly evidences
congressional intent that the ADA’s causation scheme should mirror
Title VII’s mixed-motive causation. First, while the 1991
Amendments were silent regarding the ADEA’s causation, they did
speak to the ADA. Specifically, the Amendments provided for
remedies to mixed-motive claims in Title VII’s remedies provision,
which is cross-referenced by the ADA. 161 Second, while Congress
enacted Title VII and the ADEA before the Court decided Price
Waterhouse, Congress enacted the ADA after that decision. 162 Thus,
when Congress included the phrase “because of” in the ADA’s
causation provision, it did so with the understanding that such a phrase
supported mixed-motive claims. 163 Third, legislative history shows
158

Id.
Id.
160
Id.
161
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(B)(i)–(ii), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
162
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (enacted in 1990).
163
See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir.
1996) (stating that the presumption that Congress legislates against the background
of the law is “particularly compelling where, as here, Congress adopts operative
159
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that careful debate occurred prior to the ADA’s enactment regarding
whether the word “solely” should precede “because of.” 164 The
exclusion of this qualifier in the enacted statute reflects congressional
intent for the ADA to authorize mixed-motive causation. 165
1. The ADA’s Cross-Reference to Title VII’s Powers, Remedies,
and Procedures
Where the 1991 Amendments amended several provisions of
the ADEA, including provisions relating to attorney’s fees and statutes
of limitations, it was entirely silent on the causation provision of the
ADEA. 166 In contrast, the 1991 Amendments did alter the ADA’s
causation framework. 167 As Serwatka acknowledges, the Amendments
to the Price Waterhouse decision were two-fold. 168 They changed
Title VII’s “because of” language to “motivating factor,” and they
altered Title VII’s allowance of liability and damages stemming from
a mixed-motive claim. 169 Notably, the latter amendment modified the
powers, remedies, and procedures section of Title VII that is crossreferenced by the ADA. 170 Thus, the 1991 Amendments were not
silent as to the ADA’s recognition of mixed-motive claims because
they explicitly recognized remedies for them under the ADA. 171
Serwatka focuses on the fact that the ADA’s substantive
causation phrases do not explicitly provide for mixed-motive
language to which the Supreme Court has recently given an authoritative
interpretation in a similar context”).
164
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, 85 (1990).
165
Id.
166
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (listing the 1991
Amendment’s changes to the ADEA and noting that none of the modifications
related to its causation provision).
167
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
168
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010).
169
Id.; 105 Stat. at 1075.
170
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (“the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
section 794(a) of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this
subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability
in violation of section 12132); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1).
171
See id.
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causation. 172 Under this focus, the Seventh Circuit argues that the
Amendments do not indicate congressional intent to allow mixedmotive claims under the ADA because even though the 1991
Amendments create ADA remedies for mixed-motive claims, they do
not create ADA liability. 173 This conclusion is unsound both because it
is nonsensical and because it does not match the congressional intent
behind creating this cross-reference in the ADA.
First, the Seventh Circuit argument is based on the outlandish
assumption that Congress would offer remedies to a claim that could
not be created. Given that courts have long interpreted statutes so that
each word is given operative effect, 174 it is absurd to interpret a statute
so that an entire remedy is inoperative. Where a statute explicitly
provides remedies for a certain violation, courts should not construe
that statute as to eliminate the plaintiff’s possibility of showing
liability to activate such remedies. 175 Though courts have expressed
separation-of-powers concerns in substituting Congress’ enacted
language with judicial judgment on what is sensible, the canon of
construction that directs courts to construe statutes in a manner that
avoids truly absurd results remains a legitimate interpretive tool. 176
Second, to give no effect to the ADA’s remedy for mixedmotive claims, though it is specifically included within its crossreferenced text, is to allow the ADA to fall out of step with Title VII.
Such a result is in direct contradiction to the very purpose of creating
the cross-reference in the first place. 177 Though Congress could have
simply inserted the language of Title VII into the ADA, it chose
instead to create a cross-reference. 178 Cross-references denote a
definite legislative intent for one statute’s interpretation to continually
172

Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962.
Id.
174
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
175
Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999).
176
See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989);
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 557 n.2 (2007) (rejecting an
interpretation of “air pollutants” in the Clean Air Act because it “defie[d] common
sense”).
177
H.R. REP. NO. 102-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990).
178
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
173
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align with that of another statute. 179 “When Congress [merely] repeats
the same word in a different statutory context, it is possible that
Congress might have intended the context to alter the meaning of the
word[s] . . . No such possibility exists with [cross-references].” 180
Legislative history of the ADA’s drafting reinforces this
notion. Congress provided the cross-reference to guarantee that the
ADA “currently and as amended in the future” followed Title VII. 181
Simply incorporating the language could freeze interpretation of one
statute from extending to the other. The House Report that
accompanies the ADA re-emphasized this goal, stating that “the
purpose of the ADA is to “provide civil rights protection for people
with disabilities that are parallel to those available to minorities and
women.” 182
Moreover, Congress not only intended for a broad parallel
between the ADA and Title VII, but Congress also specifically stated
that the 1991 Amendments should not diverge the two statutory
schemes. 183 The House Report which supplemented the 1991
Amendments explicitly stated that “other laws modeled after Title VII
[should] be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title
VII as amended by this Act.” 184 The ADA cannot offer parallel
protection to that of Title VII where courts construe one of the crossreferenced remedies as dormant under the ADA. 185
Notably, the ADEA, the statute on which Gross relies, lacks a
cross-reference to Title VII. Instead the ADEA cross-references the
powers, remedies, and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act,,
which itself lacks an explicit mixed-motive provision.186 Oddly, the
179

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 583 (2007)(Thomas, J.,
concurring).
180
Id.
181
H.R. REP. NO. 102-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990).
182
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990).
183
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511,
549 (2009).
184
Id.
185
See id.
186
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 29 U.S.C. § 215.
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Seventh Circuit notes this distinction in a footnote without inquiring
into whether such a distinction between the ADA and ADEA should
impact whether Gross extends to the ADA analysis. 187 Indeed, there
are meaningful similarities, specifically the cross-reference, between
the ADA and Title VII that are lacking in the ADEA. While courts
routinely refer to the ADA as a “sibling statute of Title VII,” 188 they
acknowledge that the ADEA is a “hybrid statute” that possesses
characteristics similar to both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 189
2. The Timing of the ADA’s Enactment
Indicia of legislative intent, separate from the 1991
Amendments, also demonstrate that Congress specifically intended for
the ADA to authorize mixed-motive claims. Unlike the ADEA,
Congress enacted the ADA subsequent to the Price Waterhouse
decision but prior to the 1991 Amendments. 190 A canon of
construction frequently used to determine legislative intent is that the
“evaluation of congressional action must take into account its
contemporary legal context.” 191 When choosing to word the ADA’s
causation provision with the phrase “because of,” Congress was fully
aware of Supreme Court precedent interpreting that very language to
authorize mixed-motive causation. 192 If Congress had wished for the
187

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 n.2 (7th Cir.

2010).
188

Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998).
E.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995);
Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982).
190
29 U.S.C. § 621 (enacted in 1967); Pub. L. No. 102-166 (enacted in 1991);
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (enacted in 1990).
191
Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230–31 (1996) (quoting
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979)).
192
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 546 (1988) (“It is always appropriate to
assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law”); McNely
v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE. L. J. 331, 343 (1991) (noting that Congress continually monitors Supreme
189
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ADA to have a different effect than the Price Waterhouse burdenshifting scheme, it is likely it would have enacted language that did
not fall directly under Price Waterhouse’s interpretation. 193 The same
inferences cannot be drawn for the ADEA, which was enacted prior to
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “because of.”
3. Legislative Debates on the Word “Solely”
The ADA was closely modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, a
statute which authorizes federal employees to recover for disability
discrimination. 194 Though Congress mirrored many concepts from this
statute when drafting the ADA, it intentionally altered the
Rehabilitation Act’s causation provision, which reads “solely by
reason of.” 195 After careful debate, Congress specifically chose not to
use the term “solely” in the ADA. 196 The House Committee Report
discussing the adoption of the ADA’s phrase “because of,” specifically
states: “The Committee recognizes that the phrasing of section 202 in
this legislation differs from section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] by
virtue of the fact that the phrase ‘solely by reason of his or her
handicap’ has been deleted.” 197 Just as courts must give all modifying
words operative effect, courts must also consider all omitted words in
understanding the statute. 198 Congress had debated explicitly
providing for but-for causation, through the use of the word “solely.”
Court decisions interpreting statutes and that over half of the Court’s statutory
decisions are examined in oversight hearings).
193
See id.
194
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that certain provisions
of the ADA are “drawn almost verbatim” from the Rehabilitation Act).
195
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
196
H.R. REP. NO. 485 pt. 2, 85 (1990).
197
Id.
198
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (stating that courts should
interpret all statutory words so that they are not superfluous); see Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (finding that the
statutory word “harm” included environmental modification because it was not
preceded by the qualifier “directly”); see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1498, 1506 (2009) (interpreting statute so that qualifying word “drastic” was not
superfluous).
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Its ultimate decision to omit “solely” indicates a decision not to
require but-for causation. 199
The fact that the ADEA’s “because of” language also lacks
“solely” as a modifier is less compelling evidence that Congress
intended to authorize mixed-motive claims. In contrast to the ADEA,
it can concretely be shown that the ADA’s omission was thoroughly
considered and purposefully done. Further, Serwatka need not
consider the wisdom of the Gross decision as it applies to the ADEA;
it need only determine if its logic applies to the ADA. Where there is
clear and certain evidence of congressional intent that the ADA
supports a mixed-motive claim, Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale
does not apply, and Gross does not compel the Seventh Circuit to
terminate any reliance on Price Waterhouse.
B. Gross’s Statutory Interpretation Rationale is Inapplicable to the
ADA Context.
Serwatka’s extension of Gross seems to be based solely on
Gross’s rejection of Price Waterhouse. 200 After incorrectly extending
Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that Gross mandated but-for causation in all statutes lacking the
“motivating factor” language. 201 However, Gross conducted a separate
statutory analysis of the phrase “because of” in order to come to the
conclusion that the ADEA phrase mandates but-for causation.202 Thus,
in order for the Seventh Circuit to rely on Gross in holding that
ADA’s “because of” language necessitates but-for causation, it would
need to independently examine Gross’s ADEA Statutory
Interpretation Rationale to determine if it extends to the ADA context.
Following a “careful and critical examination,” 203 this Note argues
that, like Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale, its Statutory
Interpretation Rationale also should not extend to the ADA context.
199

See also id.
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010).
201
Id.
202
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
203
Id. at 2349.
200
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Gross seems to base the majority of its justification for but-for
causation on the finding that Congress intended for Title VII and the
ADEA to have different causation provisions. 204 In a subsequent
statutory analysis of the phrase, Gross uses hurried and vague
rationale to conclude that “because of” mandates but-for causation. 205
First, Gross provided a list of synonyms for “because of” in an effort
to find the phrase’s plain meaning. 206 “Because of” equates to phrases
such as “by reason of” or “on account of,” all of which, Gross
contends, mandate but-for causation. 207 This analysis is unpersuasive
because, just like “because of,” phrases such as “by reason of” and “on
account of” also lack a modifier that would relieve the phrase of its
existing ambiguity. Indeed, the Rehabilitation Act’s causation
provision provides that a government employer cannot discriminate
“solely by reason of a disability.” 208 If the phrase “by reason of”
independently supported but-for causation, it would have been
superfluous for Congress to include “solely” in the Rehabilitation
Act. 209
Gross’s second statutory analysis argument is equally weak.
Gross argues that the default rule in burden-allocation should apply to
ADEA plaintiffs; thus, the ADEA requires but-for causation. 210
Serwatka echoes this argument and states, “unless a statute [explicitly]
provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the
plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.” 211 Gross and
Serwatka overlook the fact that often, courts poke exceptions into this
default rule in order to prevent unjust or inequitable results. 212 In
situations where there is a significant variance in access to information
204

See id. at 2349–50.
See id. at 2350–51.
206
Id. at 2350.
207
Id.
208
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
209
See id.
210
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351.
211
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010).
212
Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the
“Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 476
(2002).
205

387
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/4

32

Sues: Gross'ed Out: The Seventh Circuit's Over-Extension of <em>Gross v

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

or plaintiffs are in a particularly difficult position to meet their burden,
courts have created a variety of alternative doctrines to mitigate the
harshness of causation. 213 When the traditional burden-allocation to
the plaintiff is unfair or particularly difficult to meet, as it is within the
context of employment discrimination statutes, 214 it has been
recognized that the burdens may be adjusted to accommodate
equitable concerns. 215
Gross overemphasizes how general this rule is and fails to
recognize that Price Waterhouse “d[id] not traverse new ground” in
altering the burden-allocation of plaintiffs and defendants in the
antidiscrimination context. 216 In fact, when looking at other remedial
statutes, the Court has likewise adjusted the relative burdens between
parties to increase the scope of the statute’s coverage. 217 Courts have
construed the National Labor Relations Act, 218 the Equal Pay Act, 219
the Pregnancy and Discrimination Act, 220 and § 1983 221 as all
requiring plaintiffs to only meet the burden of showing that their
protected trait or activity was a substantial, albeit not exclusive, cause

213

Id.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (noting the
difficulty in obligating a Title VII plaintiff to “identify the precise causal role played
by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she
challenges”).
215
Kessler, supra note 212, at 498.
216
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248; see Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351.
217
Id. at 250 (referring to the court’s interpretation of causation under
employee speech doctrines, National Labor Relations Act, Equal Pay Act, and
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, all of which allow for mixed-motive causation).
218
Loparex LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 591 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir.
2009) (stating that Board must make a showing that anti-union animus was a
motivating factor in the challenged employment decision before the burden then
switches to the employer).
219
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974) (holding that
employer, not employee, must prove that the actual disparity in pay is not linked to
sex under the Equal Pay Act).
220
Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984).
221
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
214
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of the defendant’s actions. Given these many exceptions, Gross’s
default rule rationale should not be extended.
Third, Gross attempts to bolster its statutory construction with
a policy consideration, stating that burden-shifting frameworks are
difficult to apply. 222 To support this notion, Gross cites two circuit
court opinions, both of which were then over fifteen years old and one
of which was a dissenting opinion. 223 This dated precedent is
undermined by the many examples of statutes that do implement a
burden-shifting framework. 224 Additionally, Serwatka itself illustrates
that the mixed-motive framework can be successfully applied, as
evidenced from the case’s clearly-worded jury instructions and
responses. 225 Moreover, it is inappropriate to root statutory analysis in
a court’s own views of substantive policy. 226 Whether the difficulties
in applying a burden-shifting framework outweigh the benefits of
increased statutory protection is a question of balance that the
legislative branch is most equipped to decide. 227 Substantive policy “is
a question for lawmakers, not law interpreters.” 228 If it is inappropriate
for the Supreme Court to consider its own policy preferences, it is
222

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009).
Id. (relying on Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir.
1992); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting)).
224
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
225
See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d, 957, 958 (7th Cir.
2010). The jury was presented with two special verdict questions. First, “[d]id
defendant terminate plaintiff due to its perception that she was substantially limited
in her ability to walk or stand?” Id. Second, “[w]ould defendant have discharged
plaintiff if it did not believe she was substantially limited in her ability to walk or
stand, but everything else remained the same?” Id. The jury answered “yes” to both
questions. Id.
226
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S.
77, 98 n.14 (1981) (quoting U.S. v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511–13 (1954)) (The
legislature is most equipped to determine policy because “[t]he selection of . . .
policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations
that must be weighed and appraised”).
227
Id.
228
Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 259
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
223
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especially inappropriate for an intermediate appellate court to infer
policy preferences in interpreting the causation scheme of the ADA—
especially where, as discussed supra in Section III.A., legislative
history clearly suggests that Congress preferred that the ADA
authorize mixed-motive causation. Thus, this policy rationale should
not extend to Serwatka.
Overall, this nebulous reasoning does not compel the circuit
courts to adopt similar approaches in other statutory contexts because
it fails to provide a clear and applicable analogy to the ADA context.
Lacking persuasive reasoning even within the ADEA context, Gross’s
hurried statutory analysis should not be extended to the ADA, where
such an application would be one of circuit discretion rather than one
of compulsory stare decisis. 229 Thus, in addition to the Legislative
Intent Rationale, Gross’s Statutory Interpretation Rationale does not
extend to the ADA with equal force.
IV. IS PRICE WATERHOUSE APPLICABLE TO THE ADA? AN
EXAMINATION OF PRICE WATERHOUSE’S RATIONALE AND CONTINUING
VIABILITY.
Because Gross’s two rationales cannot be extended to the
ADA context to preclude reliance on Price Waterhouse or to mandate
but-for causation, the Seventh Circuit should have recognized mixedmotive claims under the ADA. This result is legally sound both
technically and doctrinally. Technically, without disruption from
Gross, application of stare decisis instructs the Seventh Circuit to
continue to apply Foster. 230 Doctrinally, Price Waterhouse, the case
on which Foster relies, uses rationale in interpreting the phrase
“because of” that applies with equal force to the ADA. This section
will first establish that Price Waterhouse’s rationale is both legally
sound and fully applicable to the ADA context. Second, this section
will establish that the subsequent congressional amendments in the
229

See supra, Section II.B.
See Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating the importance of stare decisis within the Seventh Circuit).
230
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1991 Amendments in no way depleted Price Waterhouse’s application
to circuit court ADA decisions.
A. The Rationale Behind Price Waterhouse’s Title VII Statutory
Interpretation Applies with Equal Force to the ADA.
The Price Waterhouse holding rested entirely on statutory
analysis of the phrase “because of.” 231 Simply stated by the Court,
“[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘butfor causation’ . . . is to misunderstand them.” 232 In its statutory
analysis, the Court found four independent rationales that justified
why Title VII’s “because of” language supported mixed-motive
claims. 233 Each of these four reasons applies with equal force to the
ADA.
First, the Court noted that but-for causation was an
inappropriate scheme given the present tense of Title VII’s operative
verbs. 234 Of all the textual components of a statute, verbs are most
likely to affect the legal outcome of a case.235 Courts have explicitly
considered verb tense as a reliable indicator of the statute’s
application. 236 For example, in Barrett v. United States, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Federal Gun Control Act, which provides that it
is unlawful for certain convicted criminals “to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.” 237 The defendant was a Kentuckian who went to a
231

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
Id.
233
Id. at 240–251.
234
Id. at 240.
235
Robert C. Farrell, Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern
Legal Opinions, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2008).
236
Id.; see United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992); Barrett v. United
States, 423 U.S. 212, 216–17 (1976); but see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (finding that employees who can correct their impairment
through mitigating measures do not have a disability because of the present tense
verb form of “substantially limits,” a holding which Congress overrode in the 2008
ADA Amendments).
237
423 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
232

391
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/4

36

Sues: Gross'ed Out: The Seventh Circuit's Over-Extension of <em>Gross v

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

local shop to purchase a weapon that had been originally shipped from
Massachusetts. 238 The defendant argued that the scope of the Federal
Gun Control Act did not extend to his case because the Act meant only
to restrict interstate gun trafficking and did not cover sales by local
merchants to local residents. 239 However, the Court noted that the
language regarding the foreign commerce was in present perfect tense,
denoting an action that was already completed. 240 Thus, the
defendant’s local purchase still fell into the purview of the statute,
even if the interstate gun trafficking did not occur at the moment he
made his weapon purchase. 241
Price Waterhouse made an analogous argument regarding the
operative verbs in Title VII. Specifically, Title VII states that “[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such
individual’s [protected trait.]” 242 The present tense of the proscribed
verbs indicates that courts must consider the employer’s actions at the
moment they were made in order to discern whether the employer has
violated the statute. 243 This inquiry accommodates mixed-motive
causation, which requires only a narrow analysis—whether the
employer considered an employee’s protected trait at the time of the
adverse employment action. 244 On the other hand, but-for causation is
“a hypothetical construct,” forcing courts to reason outside of the
mixed-motive claim’s narrow analysis. 245 Rather than concluding
whether an employer’s decision violated Title VII at the moment it
was made, but-for causation forces courts to hypothetically reconstruct
the factual scenario after it has been completed and determine if the
employer would have made the same decision without the illegal
238

Barrett, 432 U.S. at 213–214.
Id. at 216.
240
Id. at 216–17.
241
Id.
242
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (referencing §
703(a)(1)).
243
Id. at 241.
244
Id. at 240.
245
Id.
239
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consideration. 246 Thus, just as in Barrett, where the court’s
interpretation allowed the proscribed act to be already completed, in
order for Title VII’s language to support but-for causation, its verbs
would need to be in present perfect tense. 247 Because Title VII did not
read, “it shall be unlawful for an employer to have failed or refused to
hire or to have discharged any individual because of their protected
characteristic,” Price Waterhouse correctly concluded that the
provision did not require but-for causation. 248
This statutory construction applies with equal force to the
ADA, which also features verbs drafted in present tense, rather than
present perfect tense. Rather than stating that no employer shall have
discriminated against a qualified individual because of their disability,
the ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability . . .” 249 Moreover, the
statute then fleshes out what constitutes discrimination, listing the
proscribed actions as present tense participles. 250 Specifically,
discrimination includes “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities
or status of such applicant or employee, . . . utilizing [discriminatory]
standards, criteria, or methods of administration, . . . excluding or
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits . . .” 251 Like Barrett and
Price Waterhouse, the present tense of the operative verbs in the ADA
require courts to determine if a statutory violation occurred at the
moment the adverse employment action was made. 252 Courts cannot
meet this requirement through a but-for causation analysis; thus,
mixed-motive causation is the most appropriate interpretation. 253
Second, Price Waterhouse reasoned that because Title VII’s
causation language said “because” and not “solely because,” plaintiffs
246

Id.
See id. at 241; Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216–17 (1976).
248
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
249
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
250
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
251
Id. (emphasis added).
252
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241; Barrett, 423 U.S. at 216–17.
253
See id.
247
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need not show but-for causation. 254 Just as each included word in a
statute should be deemed to have operative effect, any missing words
should also be considered to be purposefully excluded. 255 Moreover,
specific legislative history exists to show that Congress purposefully
omitted the word “solely,” thus bolstering the assumption that the
legislature did not intend for Title VII to require but-for causation. 256
Price Waterhouse noted that Congress had considered including the
word “solely” in its drafting deliberations but ultimately declined to do
so. 257 Where Congress purposefully chose to omit a qualifying word,
the Court seemed to reason that it was improper to read that very word
into the statute’s construction. 258
This rationale comfortably extends to the ADA context. As
discussed supra in Section III.A.3., the ADA also lacks the qualifying
word “solely” in its causation phrase. Moreover, just like the drafting
deliberations of Title VII, Congress similarly discussed and debated
preceding the ADA phrase “because of” with solely, but declined to do
so. Thus, the Court’s reasoning that it should not read into a statute a
word that legislators consciously omitted applies to the ADA context.
Third, Price Waterhouse supported its Title VII statutory
analysis by reference to § 2000e-2(e), which shields employers from
liability for considering gender in an employment decision if gender is
a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.” 259 Where
Congress explicitly carves out a narrow exception in allowing
employers to consider gender, it follows that any other considerations
of gender that do not fall within the exception are proscribed, whether
they are paired with legitimate considerations or standing alone. 260
Again, this reasoning applies with equal force to the ADA
context. Just as Title VII contains explicit statutory exceptions, the
254

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
See id.
256
Id. at 241 n.7.
257
Id.
258
See id. at 241.
259
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
260
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
255
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ADA also contains explicit exceptions that permit employers to
consider an employee’s disability. For example, the ADA removes
liability from an employer for using a screening test that tends to
screen out people with disabilities where the test is “job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
accomplished by reasonable accommodation.” 261 This clause raises
the same inference that Price Waterhouse made: that “in all other
circumstances, a person’s [disability] may not be considered.” 262
Fourth, the court relied on logic and equitable principles in
construing what Congress intended “because of” to mean, stating that
“[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we
interpret a statute.” 263 Surely, the Court reasoned, Congress did not
intend for Title VII plaintiffs to endure the impossible task of
ascertaining the precise causal role of an employer’s actions by
detangling the employer’s legitimate and illegitimate
considerations. 264 If plaintiffs can show, at the least, that the defendant
did consider factors prohibited by statute, then they have shown that
the defendant is a wrong-doer in the situation. 265 Though to what
extent the employer will be liable is still not clear, it is fair that the
wrongdoer bear the difficult task of separating its own motives, should
it attempt to show that it would have made the same decision even
without considering the illegitimate factor. 266 Common sense and
equity dictate that if someone needs to “bear the risk that the influence
of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated,” it should be the
defendant because “[it] knowingly created the risk and because the
risk was created not by innocent activity but by [its] own
wrongdoing.” 267 These equitable concerns are not unique to Title VII
and should extend to the ADA.
261

42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
263
Id. at 241.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 249.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 250; Kessler, supra note 212, at 498 (stating that when causation is
particularly difficult to prove, “the malfeasor should suffer the inequity”).
262
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In sum, the rationale of Price Waterhouse’s Title VII decision
applies with equal force to the ADA context 268 and thus can be
extended to the ADA following a “careful and critical
examination.” 269 Not only had Price Waterhouse looked to language
identical to that of the ADA, but more importantly, each of its
independent rationales in support of mixed-motive causation neatly fit
within the context of the disability discrimination statute.
B. The 1991 Amendments Did Not Undermine the Instructive Value of
Price Waterhouse’s Interpretation of the Phrase “Because Of”
Viewing Price Waterhouse in isolation, Section IV.A.
discussed the applicability of that Supreme Court decision to the
ADA. Of course, before comfortably extending Price Waterhouse to
the ADA, the Seventh Circuit would need to consider the continuing
viability of this decision in light of the subsequent 1991
Amendments. 270 Gross did not indicate that the 1991 Amendments
served to undermine Price Waterhouse as good law. 271 Rather,
Gross’s focus on the 1991 Amendments related to their portrayal of
legislative intent regarding the ADEA only. 272 Serwatka, on the other
hand, seemed to reason that Price Waterhouse lost all persuasive or
instructive value following the 1991 Amendments; it essentially
concluded that the phrase “because of” could never create mixedmotive causation. 273 However, Supreme Court law, specifically Price
268

E.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Sotomayor, J.) (“Although the ADA includes no explicit mixed-motive provision, a
number of other circuits have held that the mixed-motive analysis available in the
Title VII context applies equally to cases brought under the ADA”).
269
See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
270
See Hunter v. Valley View Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating
that it was necessary to reconsider the propriety of applying Price Waterhouse to a
different statutory context in light of Gross’s comments on the 1991 Amendments).
271
See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating only that Price Waterhouse does not
control the construction of the ADEA).
272
Id. at 2349.
273
See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir.
2010).
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Waterhouse, demonstrates that “because of” can create mixed-motive
causation. 274 The Seventh Circuit erred in ignoring this instructive
precedent. The 1991 Amendments did not impair Price Waterhouse’s
continued viability; they strengthened it.
Clearly stated, the purpose of the 1991 Amendments was to
restore the protection afforded to employees under antidiscrimination
statutes, which had been eroded by Supreme Court statutory
construction. 275 In reaching this purpose, Congress responded to
various Supreme Court decisions, including Ward’s Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio 276 and Price Waterhouse. 277 Congress dissected these two
opinions into segments, codifying the aspects of the legal precedent
that afforded protection to employees and overriding the aspects of the
opinions which over-extended the employer’s interests to the
detriment of a stringent antidiscrimination policy. 278 In 1989, the
Court in Ward’s Cove followed Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 279 in
recognizing that Title VII plaintiffs can recover under disparate impact
claims where employers utilize facially-neutral employment practices
that have a disadvantageous impact on women or minority groups. 280
It departed from Griggs as to the defendant’s burden in these claims
by allowing an employer to escape liability if it could carry its burden
of producing evidence of a business justification for the challenged
employment practice. 281
274

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (stating that one of the
purposes of the 1991 Amendments was “to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination”).
276
490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 1074.
277
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
278
§ 107(a)–(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codifying mixed-motive causation and
eliminating defendant’s affirmative defense); § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074 (explicitly
providing for disparate impact claims and heightening the defendant’s burden in
escaping liability under such claims).
279
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
280
Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
281
Id. at 660.
275
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The 1991 Amendments reacted to this decision by affirming
the aspects of the opinion that increased the scope of Title VII’s
protection, 282 while overriding the aspects of the opinion that
narrowed its scope. 283 Accordingly, the Amendments codified Ward’s
Cove and Griggs’s authorization for Title VII’s disparate impact
claims by explicitly providing for such liability, 284 but they restored
protection to employees by overriding Ward’s Cove’s holding that
provided a lenient burden for the defendant. 285 Instead of the Ward’s
Cove burden, which only required the defendant to produce evidence
showing a business justification, 286 the Amendments provide for a
more stringent burden on the defendant, namely both production and
persuasion of a business necessity. 287 Thus, under the 1991
Amendments’ modification of disparate impact doctrine, courts are
more likely to find a Title VII employer liable once a plaintiff
establishes the occurrence of discriminatory practices. 288
In complete parallel, Congress reacted to the Price Waterhouse
decision by codifying the aspects of the holding that afforded
protection to the plaintiffs 289 and overriding the aspects of the holding

282

§ 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)) (“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established . . .”).
283
§ 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (a disparate impact claim is established if “a complaining party
demonstrates [a disparate impact on a protected class] and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity”).
284
§ 105(a).
285
§ 105(a)(i).
286
See 490 U.S. at 659.
287
See § 105(a)(i).
288
See id.
289
§ 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m))
(“Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice”).
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that narrowed Title VII’s protective scope. 290 Price Waterhouse had
considered two arguments: Hopkins had contended that an employer
violates Title VII any time it considers, solely or partially, a protected
trait in making an employment decision; Price Waterhouse contended
that it was the plaintiff’s burden to show that her protected trait was
the but-for cause of the challenged action. 291 In light of these
competing interests, the Court held that a “plaintiff who shows that an
impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse
employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the
burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the unlawful motive.” 292 Finding that this conclusion struck
the appropriate balance between an employee’s protection and an
employer’s free choice, the Court stated that “as often happens, the
truth lies somewhere in between.” 293 The 1991 Amendments disagreed
with this sentiment and repositioned the “truth” in favor of employee
protection. 294
In its re-balancing of interests, Congress codified the aspect of
Price Waterhouse that accommodated employee interests by explicitly
providing that Title VII plaintiffs can meet their burden through a
showing of mixed-motive causation. 295 On the other hand, the 1991
Amendments overrode the Price Waterhouse holding that equipped
employers with an affirmative defense to mixed-motive claims. 296
Specifically, the 1991 Amendments recognize that any time an
290

§ 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(B)(i)–(ii) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
703(m) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may
grant declaratory relief . . . and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and (ii) shall not
award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment”).
291
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1989).
292
Id. at 250.
293
Id. at 238.
294
See § 107(b).
295
§ 107(a).
296
§ 107(b).
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employer considers an impermissible characteristic, they have violated
federal law; however, where an employer can show that they would
have made the same decision absent the illegal consideration, its
obligations are substantially lowered. 297 The effect of this amendment
is both symbolic and practical. Symbolically, Congress has made clear
that any time an employer considers a factor prohibited by Title VII, it
has committed a violation. 298 Practically, it ensures that plaintiffs can
always collect attorney’s fees if they show that their employer
discriminated against them. 299
Clearly, the aspects of the Ward’s Cove and Price Waterhouse
decisions, which afforded employer’s discretion at the expense of
employee protection, are no longer good law as a result of the
superseding statute. 300 They were unequivocally overridden by the
1991 Act. 301 However, Congress did not call into question the Court’s
holdings that enlarged the protective scope of Title VII; rather,
Congress endorsed their instructive value through codification. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted this
exact point in his dissent in Gross:
[T]he fact that Congress endorsed this Court’s interpretation of
the “because of” language in Price Waterhouse (even as it
rejected the employer’s affirmative defense to liability)
provides all the more reason to adhere to that decision’s
motivating-factor test. Indeed, Congress emphasized in passing
the 1991 Act that the motivating-factor test was consistent with
its original intent in enacting Title VII. 302
297

Id.
See § 107(b).
299
Id.
300
Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the 1991 Act overruled Ward’s Cove’s lenient defendant burden);
Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. Red Arrow Div., 982 F.2d 892, 899 n.8 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that the 1991 Act overruled Price Waterhouse’s affirmative defense
following a plaintiff’s showing of mixed-motive).
301
See id.
302
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
298
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In parallel reasoning to the Gross dissent, following the 1991
Amendments, courts have continued to follow the codified segments
of the Court’s Title VII disparate impact precedent in other Title VII
cases 303 and to extend it to other statutory contexts. 304 For example, in
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that
Griggs’ recognition of disparate impact claims survived the 1991
Amendments when it questioned whether the ADEA authorized
recovery under these claims. 305 Smith could have applied a reasoning
akin to Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale. 306 In fact, the Court
acknowledged that the 1991 Amendments had explicitly provided for
disparate impact claims under Title VII, while remaining silent as to
such claims under the ADEA. 307 However, Smith did not reason, as
Gross did, that this legislative action indicated that the ADEA should
not recognize disparate impact claims. 308 Instead, Smith correctly
noted that Congress’ codification of a Court’s interpretation does not
undermine future reliance on that decision. 309 Explicitly stated, the
Amendments serve to provide “additional protections against unlawful
discrimination,” “additional remedies under Federal law,” and an
“expan[sion of] the scope of relevant civil rights statutes.” 310 To
reason that the Court’s employee-friendly interpretation is no longer
303

See Cota v. Tucson Police Dep’t, 783 F. Supp. 458, 472 n.14 (D. Ariz.
1992) (“The 1991 Act, however, leaves unchanged the standards for a prima facie
case. Thus, under Title VII, both before and after its recent amendment, the prima
facie inquiry in a disparate impact case will be identical”).
304
Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (concluding that
the ADEA recognizes disparate impact cases under Ward’s Cove’s pre-1991
interpretation); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 (2003) (noting that the
ADA recognizes disparate impact cases and citing to Ward’s Cove in so doing).
305
Smith, 544 U.S. at 237.
306
Id. at 240.
307
Id. (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title
VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination”).
308
Compare Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct 2343, 2349 (2009), with
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
309
Smith, 544 U.S. at 234, 240 (noting that both Griggs and Ward’s Cove are
“precedent of compelling importance” and applying them to the Title VII context).
310
Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2–3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
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good law because of Congress’ codification is to contradict Congress’
very purpose in enacting the 1991 Amendments. 311
Interestingly, Smith extended Ward’s Cove much further than
Serwatka would need to extend Price Waterhouse in order to authorize
ADA mixed-motive causation. In addition to relying on Ward’s
Cove’s bare recognition of disparate impact claims, Smith also applied
Ward’s Cove’s lenient employer’s burden, which the 1991
Amendments explicitly overruled as to the Title VII context. 312 In
recognizing mixed-motive causation, Serwatka need not rely on the
repudiated aspects of the Price Waterhouse decision; an ADA
defendant’s mitigated liability is directly controlled by the ADA’s
cross-reference to the 1991 Amendment. 313 Instead, Serwatka would
only rely on the aspect of the Price Waterhouse decision that Congress
codified. 314 If the Supreme Court has found that a clearly repudiated
provision of Ward’s Cove could apply to other statutory contexts,
surely Serwatka should have held that Price Waterhouse’s
congressionally-endorsed mixed-motive framework could apply to the
ADA. 315
Of course, a fair argument can be made that if Congress truly
agreed that the phrase “because of” supported mixed-motive
causation, amending that language to “motivating factor” was
superfluous—and when legislating, every action of Congress is
311

See id.
Smith, 540 U.S. at 240 (“Ward’s Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title
VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA”). Smith is an example of
using what scholars refer to as “shadow precedent,” where courts find judicial
interpretation of statutory language controlling with respect to any application not
explicitly addressed by the congressional override. Widiss, supra note 183, at 532.
Widiss argues that this practice is controversial because it thwarts congressional will
and diminishes the predictability and fairness of stare decisis. Id. at 560–01. If
Serwatka had relied on Price Waterhouse’s bare recognition of mixed-motive
causation, it would not have engaged in this controversial practice because Congress
did not override that aspect of the Price Waterhouse holding. See id. at 532.
313
42 U.S.C. § 12133.
314
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075.
315
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
312
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intentional and operative. 316 However, Congress codifies Court
precedent frequently without any intent to correct it.317 In so doing, it
merely solidifies or clarifies existing precedent. 318 This practice does
not cast any doubt on the Court’s decision. 319
Price Waterhouse, in establishing mixed-motive causation, did
so in a splintered and uncertain fashion. 320 Four Justices joined a
plurality opinion, Justice White and Justice O’Connor separately
concurred in the judgment, and three Justices dissented. 321 While six
Justices ultimately agreed that the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant if a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a
“motivating” or “substantial” factor in the employer’s decision, it
remained unclear whether plaintiffs, in meeting their burden, needed
to present direct evidence of discrimination. 322
Given these fractures in the Court’s voice, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress meant only to clarify that the statutory
language, “because of,” does indeed support a mixed-motive causation
scheme. 323 Moreover, this codification guaranteed that Price
316

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
E.g., United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
that congressional reaction to Hughey v. U.S. codified rather than undermined the
Hughey decision and recognizing that congressional codification of a court’s
statutory interpretation is “by no means an unusual tack for Congress to take”); see
Eskridge, supra note 192, at 424–27 (app. I) (noting seven examples from the 100th
and 101st Congressional sessions where Congress amended statutes with the purpose
of clarifying the statutes’ interpretations rather than overriding them).
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2347 (listing the specifics of the “splintered” Price
Waterhouse decision).
321
Id.
322
See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
323
While the 1991 Amendment’s legislative history explicitly states that it is
overturning certain Court holdings, the history shows that the Amendments only
clarified Price Waterhouse’s recognition of mixed-motive causation. See 137 CONG.
REC. E3832 (1991) (statement of Rep. Dixon). For example, California
Representative Dixon stated that the “motivating factor” amendment is a
“compromise [that] makes clear that any employer may not make an employment
decision based in any way on race, color, sex, or national origin.” Id. (emphasis
added).
317
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Waterhouse’s interpretation was no longer susceptible to the Court’s
reexamination or modification. 324 The risk of Court reexamination
seemed likely, given the inter-opinion disagreement; a codification
enabled Congress to definitively end the debate with a clear, single
voice. 325 In sum, the 1991 Amendments did not vitiate the continued
applicability of Price Waterhouse’s instructive value. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit should rely on its rationale in authorizing mixedmotive claims under the ADA.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE 2008 ADA AMENDMENTS: EXCHANGING
“BECAUSE OF” WITH “ON THE BASIS OF”
Judge Rovner acknowledged that her decision in Serwatka did
not take into consideration the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. 326
Though these amendments have been in effect since January 1, 2009,
the Seventh Circuit decided Serwatka under the ADA’s original
language because Serwatka was discharged in 2004 and the trial
occurred in 2008, all before the amendments took effect. 327 The
Amendments, among other things, modify the ADA’s causation
phrase, replacing “because of” with a prohibition against
discriminating against an individual “on the basis of” a disability. 328 In
a footnote, Judge Rovner stated that, “[w]hether ‘on the basis of’
means anything different from ‘because of,’ and whether this or any
other revision to the statute matters in terms of the viability of a
mixed-motive claim under the ADA, are not questions that we need to
consider in this appeal.” 329 As time passes, the Seventh Circuit is
324

Widiss, supra note 183, at 520.
Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162, 2170 (2002) (“[E]xplicit phrasing can offer a more precise statutory
resolution, often one that is unavailable as a legal interpretation, and thus reflect
political preferences more accurately than judicial guesses of what the legislature
would have done”).
326
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 n.1 (7th Cir.
2010).
327
Id.
328
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009).
329
Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962 n.1.
325
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certain to face this analysis. This section will argue that “on the basis
of” supports a mixed-motive claim. 330
Seemingly, “on the basis of” is the equivalent of “because of;”
thus, the arguments presented in Sections III and IV relating to the
extension of Gross and Price Waterhouse also apply to the 2008 ADA
Amendments. However, an independent statutory analysis of this
phrase is useful because the phrase “on the basis of” presents fresh
statutory language that the Court has not yet interpreted in an
antidiscrimination employment statute.
The first step in analyzing a statute is always to look to the text
to determine whether the language is plain and unambiguous. 331 A
closer look into this phrase indicates that it may offer greater
justification for mixed-motive causation than did the phrase “because
of.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “basis” as “a fundamental
principle, and underlying fact or condition.” 332 An underlying fact or
condition suggests a non-exclusive causal role because for a fact to be
underlying, it must have a relation to another fact. Thus, where an
employer acts “on the basis of disability,” it need not act exclusively
because of the disability. Rather, the disability need only form one part
of the decision or, like in Title VII, be a motivating factor of the
decision. 333
Though the definition of “basis” suggests that this amended
causation phrase supports mixed-motive causation, the argument is far
from conclusive. “On the basis of” shares the same problem of
ambiguity as “because of.” 334 Both phrases necessitate a preceding
330

Few courts have addressed the statutory analysis of the amended phrase “on
the basis of.” A New York District Court provided a cursory analysis of this issue
and concluded that despite the change in statutory analysis, it would follow Second
Circuit precedent to find that “because of” allowed mixed-motive claims. Doe v.
Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
331
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
332
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009).
333
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
334
This ambiguity is easily reflected by the fact that the Supreme Court
conducted independent analyses of the phrase “because of” used in similar contexts
and came up with two conflicting, plausible results. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
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qualifier in order to allow only one plausible interpretation. 335 Had
Congress stated that an employer could not act “solely because of” an
employee’s disability or “solely on the basis of” an employee’s
disability, then a court’s interpretation would necessarily need to find
but-for causation. 336 On the other hand, Congress likewise did not
precede these causation phrases with a qualifier such as “partially” that
would explicitly provide mixed-motive causation.
Indeed, in interpreting antidiscrimination statutes, the Court
has placed weighty emphasis on the presence or absence of a qualifier
to the statutory language. 337 For example, in Robinson, the Court
found the use of the word “employees” in Title VII to be ambiguous
because it was not preceded by a qualifier such as “current” or
“former.” 338 In light of this ambiguity, the Court selected the
interpretation that would match the broad, remedial purposes of Title
VII and increased its coverage; thus, the Court determined employees
to mean both current and former employees. 339
Under Robinson, the ambiguity of “on the basis of” should be
determined by reference to the broader context of the statute as a
whole. 340 Like Title VII, the ADA features a very broad goal. 341 The
overall purposes of the ADA include to “provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; . . . to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination . . . ; and .
. . to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . . . in order to
address the major areas of discrimination.” 342 Additionally, the ADA’s
congressional findings echo the remedial nature of this statute, stating
that discrimination towards people with disabilities is a societal
335

See also Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (finding that “employee” was
ambiguous because it lacked a temporal modifier).
336
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
337
E.g., Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
338
Id.
339
Id. at 345.
340
Id. at 341.
341
See 42 U.S.C.§ 12101(b).
342
Id. (emphasis added).
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problem. 343 Thus, ambiguous ADA phrases should be interpreted
according to the familiar statutory maxim that remedial statutes are
construed broadly. 344 Mixed-motive causation increases employee
protection and is the appropriate construction.
Even if the ambiguity cannot be resolved, an additional step in
statutory analysis still indicates that “on the basis of” should authorize
mixed-motive claims. If a proper interpretation cannot be gleaned
from the statute’s text, courts should examine the legislative history
behind the statutory text in order to ascertain the appropriate
meaning. 345 Legislative history pertaining to the 2008 ADA
Amendments indicates that the inclusion of the phrase “on the basis
of” was intended to serve the narrow purpose of correcting the Court’s
interpretation in Sutton v. United Air Lines. In Sutton, the Court held
that a person with a device that mitigates their impairments, such as
glasses or contacts, was no longer deemed to have a disability under
the ADA. 346 Throughout the ADA Amendment Senate Report, the
only reference to “on the basis of” related to the clarification of Sutton.
In a section-by-section analysis of the changes that the Amendments
Act would effectuate, the Senate Report comments regarding the
inclusion of “on the basis of” were limited to:
Discrimination on the Basis of Disability. Prohibits
discrimination under Title I of the ADA “on the basis of
disability” rather than “against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual.”
Clarifies that covered entities that use qualification standards
based on uncorrected vision must show that such a requirement
is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 347
343

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
Briscoe v. Lattue, 460 U.S. 325, 348–49 (1983).
345
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985) (“Because we
find the statute ambiguous on its face, we seek guidance in the . . . relevant
legislative history”).
346
527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
347
Statement of Managers to Accompany S3406, The Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, 110th Cong. 154 (2008) (statements of Sen.
Harkin and Sen. Hatch).
344
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Thus the legislative intent shows that the change in causation
phrasing was not intended to alter the plaintiff’s burden in showing
discrimination or to create any meaningful deviation from the phrase
“because of.” 348 Rather, the change in the causation phrase was an
inadvertent word choice occurring within a larger amendment that
prohibited courts from considering mitigating devices when
determining whether an employee had a disability under the ADA. 349
This legislative history indicates that Congress did not have an
objective to change the causation scheme of the ADA. 350 Prior to
Gross and at the time of the 2008 ADA Amendments’ enactment, a
vast majority of the circuit courts were applying mixed-motive
causation to ADA claims. 351 This indicates congressional intent that
the ADA allow plaintiffs to recover under mixed-motive claims.
CONCLUSION
Given the frequency with which the Supreme Court hears
antidiscrimination cases and the friction between Price Waterhouse
and Gross, it is likely that the Court will soon explicitly define what
particular causation scheme the ADA authorizes. In the interim, circuit
courts should look to the rationale underlying the Court’s
interpretations in Gross and Price Waterhouse. In doing so, circuit
courts should rely on Price Waterhouse and authorize recovery under
the ADA for mixed-motive claims.

348

See id.
See id.
350
See id.
351
Supra, notes 26–27.
349

408
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

53

